# GMU AL – Round 3 NU Open Source

## 1

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#### The “United States federal government” is the three branches in DC

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>; RP]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### Expanding the scope of CORE antitrust law requires modifying Sherman, FTC, or Clayton

US Chamber of Commerce, no date [America’s Antitrust Laws Protect Competition and Benefit Consumers, https://www.uschamber.com/antitrust-laws,]

Antitrust laws ensure competition in a free and open market economy, which is the foundation of any vibrant economy. And healthy competition among sellers in an open marketplace gives consumers the benefits of lower prices, higher quality products and services, more choices, and greater innovation. The core of U.S. antitrust law was created by three pieces of legislation: the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Clayton Antitrust Act. These laws have evolved along with the market, vigilantly guarding against anti-competitive harm that arises from abuse of dominance, bid rigging, price fixing, and customer allocation.

#### Prohibitions are legal restrictions against certain conduct.

DLD ‘ND [Duhaime's Law Dictionary; “Prohibition Definition”; http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/P/Prohibition.aspx; AS]

A legal restriction against the use of something or against certain conduct.

#### Antitrust debates are good---rigorous and iterative research gives us the tools to challenge violent corporate monopolization.

Greer and Rice 21 – Jeremie Greer and Solana Rice are Co-founders and Co-executives of Liberation in a Generation, a national movement-support organization working to build the power of people of color to transform the economy.

Jeremie Greer and Solana Rice, “Anti-Monopoly Activism: Reclaiming Power Through Racial Justice,” *Liberation in a Generation*, March 2021, pp. 3-13, https://www.liberationinageneration.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Anti-Monopoly-Activism\_032021.pdf.

It is critical that grassroots leaders of color are positioned to lead on anti-monopoly policy, as they are uniquely positioned to understand its impact on people of color at the household, community, and societal levels. This gives them a unique perspective in policy ideation efforts that should be valued and validated. These leaders also possess the unique skills to mobilize the people and public power that are necessary to force the government to reclaim its historic role of reining in runaway corporate monopoly power.

We at Liberation in a Generation believe that the power to change our economic systems rests with the organizers of color who are building the political strength of communities of color. Anti-monopoly research and advocacy need to better quantify, center, and reflect what people of color are experiencing and the ways that they are being harmed by monopoly power’s reach. These efforts should also better connect anti-monopoly policy and advocacy as tools to advance the existing priorities of leaders of color, such as the Green New Deal, Medicare for All, closing the racial wealth gap, and a Homes Guarantee. This paper aims to contribute a major step in the long journey of bridging the divide between anti-monopoly researchers and policy advocates and grassroots leaders of color. The first step on that journey is knowledge.

Recognizing that anti-monopoly work is a new policy issue to many grassroots leaders of color, this paper will serve as a primer to 1) educate grassroots leaders on the issue of corporate concentration, 2) connect the issue to racial justice, and 3) recommend a path forward for grassroots leaders as well as the researchers and advocates who need to embrace them. Our hope is that this paper provides a foundation of knowledge that grassroots leaders of color can use to build race-conscious solutions and mobilize for action to rein in runaway corporate monopoly power. To that end, the paper is organized into six sections.

SECTION 1 Monopoly Power Is Corporate Power Magnified and Maximized

In 1975, millions flooded theaters to see the blockbuster thriller Jaws. The story follows a police chief in a small resort town as he risks his life to protect beachgoers from a monstrous man-eating great white shark.

Monopolies are a lot like the shark in Jaws. While enormous, ruthless, dangerous, and scary, the movie’s monster is just a shark, and the police chief uses tools and community to defeat it. Comparatively, while also enormous, ruthless, dangerous, and even scary, monopolies are just corporations, and we, together, can confront them. Their massive power controls the wages we earn, the prices we pay, and the actions of the politicians who are supposed to represent us in DC, the statehouse, and city hall. In a representative democracy, we the people are at the top of the food chain, and it is within our power to make these monopolies fear us— and end their existence in the first place.

Grassroots leaders of color are highly experienced and uniquely skilled at challenging corporate power, and these capacities can and should be used to curb monopoly power. For example, the Athena Coalition8 has successfully leveraged grassroots power to challenge the monopoly power of Amazon, and Color of Change9 has effectively used grassroots digital organizing to challenge the monopoly power of social media platforms such as Facebook. Putting monopolies in the crosshairs of organizers is critical because they best understand the real human and structural devastation caused by monopoly power, which is otherwise all too easily neglected.

Though we believe that grassroots leaders of color have the experience and expertise necessary to challenge monopoly power, the question remains: Why should they lead this fight? Grassroots leaders of color are already engaged in high-stakes battles with the forces of corporate power on fundamental issues, including environmental justice, worker justice, housing justice, prison and police abolition, and voter and democratic justice. We believe that these efforts can be bolstered if anti-monopoly policy development and advocacy were incorporated into these existing efforts but then followed the lead of organizers. For example, the primary opponents of prison and police abolition are private prison monopolies, such as GEO Group and CoreCivic, which profit from the arrest and incarceration of Black and brown people. Opponents of the Green New Deal include energy monopolies BP and ExxonMobile, whose profits are derived from polluting Black and brown communities.10 Finally, opponents of the Homes Guarantee, and its call for creating 12 million units of social housing outside of the for-profit housing market, include big banks that profit from the commodification of affordable and low-income housing. Challenging these opponents by diminishing their monopoly power could prove to be a powerful weapon in the fight to dismantle unchecked corporate power and its real-life economic impact on people of color.

How Corporate Monopolies Show Up in Today’s World

The distinguishing features of monopolies, when compared to your run of the mill corporation (large or small), are the reach and intensity of the corporate power that they wield. Monopoly power turbocharges the ills of corporate power and creates a wider impact of the overlapping consequences for people. In many ways, monopolies are created when corporate power becomes governing power.11 Their sheer size and market dominance allow them to govern markets, and their expansive wealth gives them the power to manipulate prices, crush workers, and steamroll governments. Ultimately, monopolies’ extreme economic power—which they use to gain outsized political power and then more economic power—undermines the collective power of workers, consumers, small businesses, local communities, and governments.

It has become difficult, and inadequate, to rely on legal definitions to identify monopolies. The legal definition of monopolization is highly technical and complicated by centuries of conflicting jurisprudence. It's been narrowed to exclusively focus on the negative impact that anticompetitive actions have on consumers.12 This narrower focus intentionally shielded monopolies from any accountability for anticompetitive harm inflicted on workers, the environment, local communities, government, and democracy. Federal enforcement of monopoly power is confined to the highly specialized legal practice of antitrust law enforcement.13 However, centuries of political power wielded by corporate monopolies and their acolytes (e.g., universities, think tanks, trade associations, and major law firms) have rendered much of antitrust law enforcement toothless.14

In the late 19th and early 20th century, the definition of monopoly was much wider and comprehensive. In this paper, we will expand the definition as well. Recognizing that this definitional work is in many ways a work in progress, we offer our definition as a point of discussion and debate for the larger field of anti-monopoly advocates.

In this paper, we define monopoly as a corporate entity (a single corporation or a group of corporations) whose sheer size and anticompetitive behavior grant it disproportionate economic power and governing influence. This negatively affects the well-being of workers, consumers, markets, local communities, democratic governance, and the planet.

Below are a few major industries that reveal how corporate concentration and monopolistic industries harm the economic lives of workers, consumers, and communities of color.

Big Tech

Four corporations comprise what has come to be known as “Big Tech”: Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Alphabet (the parent company of Google). Each of these technology firms dominate an enormous share of their respective technology markets. Google, for example, controls 90 percent of the internet search market, and it controls the largest video sharing platform on the internet through its ownership of YouTube. Apple controls 50 percent of the cellphone market,15 and Amazon controls 50 percent of all ecommerce. Facebook and its many subsidiaries (such as WhatsApp and Instagram) dominate the social media and online advertising marketplace.16 Other technology firms, including Uber, Lyft, Microsoft, and Netflix, also demonstrate monopolistic, anticompetitive behavior in their respective markets. In many ways, these companies, and the people who control them, are the “robber barons” of our time.

Big Pharma

The world's largest pharmaceutical corporations, including Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, Merck, Gilead, Amgen, and AbbVie, together comprise “Big Pharma.” These monopolies build their profits by controlling the prices of critical life-saving pharmaceuticals (e.g., insulin, drugs that regulate blood pressure, and critical antibiotics) and life-altering medical devices (e.g., heart stents and joint replacement devices). Between 2000 and 2018, a disproportionately small number of pharmaceutical companies made a combined $11 trillion in revenue and $8.6 trillion in gross profits.17 In 2014, the top 10 pharmaceutical companies had 38 percent of the industry’s total sales revenue.18 Much of these profits were gained driving up the price of critical drugs , extorting research and development (R&D) funding from the government, and leveraging Big Pharma’s political influence to weaken government oversight of the industry.19

Big Agriculture

Big Agriculture, or “Big Ag,” refers to monopolies that control major aspects of the global food supply chain. This includes companies such as Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM), Bayer, and John Deere. Though once a diffuse network of small farmers and supply chain companies, recent mergers have created a system comprising a small number of corporations that are crowding out smaller, family-run companies including small farms. Similar to Big Pharma, government subsidies are a massive component of the obscene profits made by Big Ag. Further, as often the largest employer in many small rural towns, these corporations often ruthlessly wield their monopoly power to drive down wages and benefits to workers, skirt government safety regulations, and bully (and even buy out) small farmers.

Big Banks

Known as the “Big Five,” five banks control almost half of the industry’s nearly $15 trillion in financial assets: JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and US Bancorp. Their collective importance to the nation’s financial system has led some to consider them “too big to fail.”20 In fact, in response to the financial crisis of 2008, the federal government provided trillions of dollars in relief to ensure that they did not collapse under the weight of the crisis.21 The Big Five have an incredible influence over the flow of money throughout our economy. They finance critical goods and services, such as housing, higher education, infrastructure, and renewable energy. They also finance extractive elements of our economy, such as fossil fuels and private prisons. But, most importantly, they set the rules for who can and cannot access loan capital, and their exclusionary practices have been widely linked to the growth of racial wealth inequality (as described in Section 3).

## 2

#### Avoiding institution-building abdicates the potential for communal power and reduces revolution to static bursts of energy

Srnicek & Williams ‘15 (Nick, Theorist and activist, and Alex, PhD student at the University of East London, *Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work,* ebook)

To invoke modernity is ultimately to raise the question of the future. What should the future look like? What courses should we set? What does it mean to be contemporary? And whose future is it? Since the emergence of the term, modernity has been concerned with unravelling a circular or retrospective notion of time and introducing a rupture between the present and the past. With this break, the future is projected as being potentially different from and better than the past.14 Modernity is tantamount to ‘the discovery of the future’ and has therefore found itself intimately linked with notions such as ‘progress, advance, development, emancipation, liberation, growth, accumulation, Enlightenment, embetterment, [and the] avant-garde’.15 Suggesting that history can progress through deliberate human action, it is the nature of this progress that competing definitions of modernity have struggled over.16 Historically, the left has found its natural home in being oriented towards the future. From early communist visions of technological progress, to Soviet space utopias, to the social democratic rhetoric of the ‘white heat of technology’, what set the left apart from the right was its unambiguous embrace of the future. The future was to be an improvement over the present in material, social and political terms. By contrast, the forces of the political right were, with a few notable exceptions, defined by their defence of tradition and their essentially reactionary nature.17 This situation was reversed during the rise of neoliberalism, with politicians like Thatcher commanding the rhetoric of modernisation and the future to great effect. Co-opting these terms and mobilising them into a new hegemonic common sense, neoliberalism’s vision of modernity has held sway ever since. Consequently, discussions of the left in terms of the future now seem aberrant, even absurd. With the postmodern moment, the seemingly intrinsic links between the future, modernity and emancipation were prized apart. Philosophers like Simon Critchley can now confidently assert that ‘we have to resist the idea and ideology of the future, which is always the ultimate trump card of capitalist ideas of progress’.18 Such folk-political sentiments blindly accept the neoliberal common sense, preferring to shy away from grand visions and replace them with a posturing resistance. From the radical left’s discomfort with technological modernity to the social democratic left’s inability to envision an alternative world, everywhere today the future has largely been ceded to the right. A skill that the left once excelled at – building enticing visions for a better world – has deteriorated after years of neglect. If the left is to recover a sense of progress, however, it cannot simply adopt the classic images of history headed towards a singular destination. Progress, for these approaches, was not only possible, but in fact woven as a necessity into the very fabric of history. Human societies were thought to travel along a pre-defined pathway towards a single outcome modelled after Europe. The nations of Europe were deemed to have developed capitalist modernity independently, and their historical experiences of development were considered to be both necessary and superior to those of other cultures.19 Such ideas dominated traditional European philosophy and continued on in the influential modernisation literature of the 1950s and 1960s, with their attempts to naturalise capitalism against a Soviet opponent.20 Partly endorsed by both early Marxism and later Keynesian and neoliberal capitalisms, a one-size-fits-all model of historical progress positioned non-Western societies as lacking and in need of development – a position that served to justify colonial and imperial practices.21 From the standpoint of their philosophical critics, these notions of progress were disparaged precisely for their belief in preconceived destinations – whether in the liberal progression towards capitalist democracy or in the Marxist progression towards communism. The complex and often disastrous record of the twentieth century demonstrated conclusively that history could not be relied upon to follow any predetermined course.22 Regression was as likely as progress, genocide as possible as democratisation.23 In other words, there was nothing inherent in the nature of history, the development of economic systems, or sequences of political struggle that could guarantee any particular outcome. From a broadly left perspective, for example, even those limited but not insignificant political gains that have been achieved – such as welfare provision, women’s rights and worker protections – can be rolled back. Moreover, even in states where nominally communist governments took power, it proved far more difficult than expected to transition from a capitalist system of production to a fully communist one.24 This series of historical experiences fuelled an internal critique of European modernity by way of psychoanalysis, critical theory and poststructuralism. For the thinkers of postmodernism, modernity came to be associated with a credulous naivety.25 In Jean-François Lyotard’s epochal definition, postmodernity was identified as the era that has grown to be suspicious of the grand metanarrative.26 On this account, postmodernity is a cultural condition of disillusionment with the kinds of grandiose narratives represented by capitalist, liberal and communist accounts of progress. To be sure, these critiques capture something important about the chronological texture of our time. And yet, the announcement of the end of grand narratives has often been viewed by those outside Europe as being absolutely of a piece with modernity.27 Further, with the benefit of thirty years’ hindsight, the broader impact of the cultural condition diagnosed by Lyotard has not been the decline of belief in metanarratives per se, but rather a broad disenchantment with those offered by the left. The association between capitalism and modernisation remains, while properly progressive notions of the future have wilted under postmodern critique and been quashed beneath the social wreckage of neoliberalism. Most significantly, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of globalisation, history does appear to have a grand narrative.28 Throughout the world, markets, wage labour, commodities and productivity-enhancing technologies have all expanded under the systemic imperative to accumulate. Capitalism has become the destiny of contemporary societies, happily coexisting with national differences and paying little heed to clashes between civilisations. But we can draw a distinction here between the endpoint (capitalism) and the pathway towards it. Indeed, the mutual entanglement of countries means that the European pathway (heavily reliant on exploiting colonies and slavery) is barred for many of the newly developing countries. While there are broad paradigms of development, each country has had to find its own unique way to respond to the imperatives of global capitalism. The path of capitalist modernisation is therefore instantiated in different cultures, following different trajectories and with different rhythms of development.29 Uneven and combined development is the order of the day.30 Progress is therefore not bound to a single European path, but is instead filtered through a variety of political and cultural constellations, all directed towards instantiating capitalist relations. Today, modernisers simply fight over which variant of capitalism to install. Recuperating the idea of progress under such circumstances means, first and foremost, contesting the dogma of this inevitable endpoint. Capitalist modernity was never a necessary outcome, but instead a successful project driven by various classes and a systemic imperative towards accumulation and expansion. Various modernities are possible, and new visions of the future are essential for the left. Such images are a necessary supplement to any transformative political project. They give a direction to political struggles and generate a set of criteria to adjudicate which struggles to support, which movements to resist, what to invent, and so on. In the absence of images of progress, there can only be reactivity, defensive battles, local resistance and a bunker mentality – what we have characterised as folk politics. Visions of the future are therefore indispensable for elaborating a movement against capitalism. Contra the earlier thinkers of modernity, there is no necessity to progress, nor a singular pathway from which to adjudicate the extent of development. Instead, progress must be understood as hyperstitional: as a kind of fiction, but one that aims to transform itself into a truth. Hyperstitions operate by catalysing dispersed sentiment into a historical force that brings the future into existence. They have the temporal form of ‘will have been’. Such hyperstitions of progress form orienting narratives with which to navigate forward, rather than being an established or necessary property of the world. Progress is a matter of political struggle, following no pre-plotted trajectory or natural tendency, and with no guarantee of success. If the supplanting of capitalism is impossible from the standpoint of one or even many defensive stances, it is because any form of prospective politics must set out to construct the new. Pathways of progress must be cut and paved, not merely travelled along in some pre-ordained fashion; they are a matter of political achievement rather than divine or earthly providence.

#### Capitalism locks in extinction – it depoliticizes the left, collapses the environment causes endless war, and a backsliding into fascism that accelerates their impacts – the status quo can and will get worse absent the alternative

Shaviro 15 – (Steven Shaviro is an American academic, philosopher and cultural critic whose areas of interest include film theory, time, science fiction, panpsychism, capitalism, affect and subjectivity. He earned a PhD from Yale in 1981. “No Speed Limit: Three Essays on Accelerationism” <https://track5.mixtape.moe/qdkkdt.pdf> rvs)

The problem may be summarized as follows. Capitalism has indeed created the conditions for general prosperity and therefore for its own supersession. But it has also blocked, and continues to block, any hope of realizing this transformation. We cannot wait for capitalism to transform on its own, but we also cannot hope to progress by appealing to some radical Outside or by fashioning ourselves as militants faithful to some “event” that (as Badiou has it) would mark a radical and complete break with the given “situation” of capitalism. Accelerationism rather demands a movement against and outside capitalism—but on the basis of tendencies and technologies that are intrinsic to capitalism. Audre Lord famously argued that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.” But what if the master’s tools are the only ones available? Accelerationism grapples with this dilemma. What is the appeal of accelerationism today? It can be understood as a response to the particular social and political situation in which we currently seem to be trapped: that of a long-term, slow-motion catastrophe. Global warming, and environmental pollution and degradation, threaten to undermine our whole mode of life. And this mode of life is itself increasingly stressful and precarious, due to the depredations of neoliberal capitalism. As Fredric Jameson puts it, the world today is characterized by “heightened polarization, increasing unemployment, [and] the ever more desperate search for new investments and new markets.” These are all general features of capitalism identified by Marx, but in neoliberal society we encounter them in a particularly pure and virulent form. I want to be as specific as possible in my use of the term “neoliberalism” in order to describe this situation. I define neoliberalism as a specific mode of capitalist production (Marx), and form of governmentality (Foucault), that is characterized by the following specific factors: 1. The dominating influence of financial institutions, which facilitate transfers of wealth from everybody else to the already extremely wealthy (the “One Percent” or even the top one hundredth of one percent). 2. The privatization and commodification of what used to be common or public goods (resources like water and green space, as well as public services like education, communication, sewage and garbage disposal, and transportation). 3. The extraction, by banks and other large corporations, of a surplus from all social activities: not only from production (as in the classical Marxist model of capitalism) but from circulation and consumption as well. Capital accumulation proceeds not only by direct exploitation but also by rent-seeking, by debt collection, and by outright expropriation (“primitive accumulation”). 4. The subjection of all aspects of life to the so-called discipline of the market. This is equivalent, in more traditional Marxist terms, to the “real subsumption” by capital of all aspects of life: leisure as well as labor. Even our sleep is now organized in accordance with the imperatives of production and capital accumulation. 5. The redefinition of human beings as private owners of their own “human capital.” Each person is thereby, as Michel Foucault puts it, forced to become “an entrepreneur of himself.” In such circumstances, we are continually obliged to market ourselves, to “brand” ourselves, to maximize the return on our “investment” in ourselves. There is never enough: like the Red Queen, we always need to keep running, just to stay in the same place. Precarity is the fundamental condition of our lives. All of these processes work on a global scale; they extend far beyond the level of immediate individual experience. My life is precarious, at every moment, but I cannot apprehend the forces that make it so. I know how little money is left from my last paycheck, but I cannot grasp, in concrete terms, how “the economy” works. I directly experience the daily weather, but I do not directly experience the climate. Global warming and worldwide financial networks are examples of what the ecological theorist Timothy Morton calls hyperobjects. They are phenomena that actually exist but that “stretch our ideas of time and space, since they far outlast most human time scales, or they’re massively distributed in terrestrial space and so are unavailable to immediate experience.” Hyperobjects affect everything that we do, but we cannot point to them in specific instances. The chains of causality are far too complicated and intermeshed for us to follow. In order to make sense of our condition, we are forced to deal with difficult abstractions. We have to rely upon data that are gathered in massive quantities by scientific instruments and then collated through mathematical and statistical formulas but that are not directly accessible to our senses. We find ourselves, as Mark Hansen puts it, entangled “within networks of media technologies that operate predominantly, if not almost entirely, outside the scope of human modes of awareness (consciousness, attention, sense perception, etc.).” We cannot imagine such circumstances in any direct or naturalistic way, but only through the extrapolating lens of science fiction. Subject to these conditions, we live under relentless environmental and financial assault. We continually find ourselves in what might well be called a state of crisis. However, this involves a paradox. A crisis—whether economic, ecological, or political—is a turning point, a sudden rupture, a sharp and immediate moment of reckoning. But for us today, crisis has become a chronic and seemingly permanent condition. We live, oxymoronically, in a state of perpetual, but never resolved, convulsion and contradiction. Crises never come to a culmination; instead, they are endlessly and indefinitely deferred. For instance, after the economic collapse of 2008, the big banks were bailed out by the United States government. This allowed them to resume the very practices—the creation of arcane financial instruments, in order to enable relentless rent-seeking—that led to the breakdown of the economic system in the first place. The functioning of the system is restored, but only in such a way as to guarantee the renewal of the same crisis, on a greater scale, further down the road. Marx rightly noted that crises are endemic to capitalism. But far from threatening the system as Marx hoped, today these crises actually help it to renew itself. As David Harvey puts it, it is precisely “through the destruction of the achievements of preceding eras by way of war, the devaluation of assets, the degradation of productive capacity, abandonment and other forms of ‘creative destruction’” that capitalism creates “a new basis for profit-making and surplus absorption.” What lurks behind this analysis is the frustrating sense of an impasse. Among its other accomplishments, neoliberal capitalism has also robbed us of the future. For it turns everything into an eternal present. The highest values of our society—as preached in the business schools—are novelty, innovation, and creativity. And yet these always only result in more of the same. How often have we been told that a minor software update “changes everything”? Our society seems to function, as Ernst Bloch once put it, in a state of “sheer aimless infinity and incessant changeability; where everything ought to be constantly new, everything remains just as it was.” This is because, in our current state of affairs, the future exists only in order to be colonized and made into an investment opportunity. John Maynard Keynes sought to distinguish between risk and genuine uncertainty. Risk is calculable in terms of probability, but genuine uncertainty is not. Uncertain events are irreducible to probabilistic analysis, because “there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever.” Keynes’s discussion of uncertainty has strong affinities with Quentin Meillassoux’s account of hyperchaos. For Meillassoux, there is no “totality of cases,” no closed set of all possible states of the universe. Therefore, there is no way to assign fixed probabilities to these states. This is not just an empirical matter of insufficient information; uncertainty exists in principle. For Meillassoux and Keynes alike, there comes a point where “we simply do not know.” But today, Keynes’s distinction is entirely ignored. The Black-Scholes Formula and the Efficient Market Hypothesis both conceive the future entirely in probabilistic terms. In these theories, as in the actual financial trading that is guided by them (or at least rationalized by them), the genuine unknowability of the future is transformed into a matter of calculable, manageable risk. True novelty is excluded, because all possible outcomes have already been calculated and paid for in terms of the present. While this belief in the calculability of the future is delusional, it nonetheless determines the way that financial markets actually work. We might therefore say that speculative finance is the inverse—and the complement—of the “affirmative speculation” that takes place in science fiction. Financial speculation seeks to capture, and shut down, the very same extreme potentialities that science fiction explores. Science fiction is the narration of open, unaccountable futures; derivatives trading claims to have accounted for, and discounted, all these futures already. The “market”—nearly deified in neoliberal doctrine—thus works preemptively, as a global practice of what Richard Grusin calls premediation. It seeks to deplete the future in advance. Its relentless functioning makes it nearly impossible for us to conceive of any alternative to the global capitalist world order. Such is the condition that Mark Fisher calls capitalist realism. As Fisher puts it, channeling both Jameson and Žižek, “it’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism.”

**The alternative is to affirm the model of the Communist Party – only the Party can provide effective accountability mechanisms and praxis necessary to mobilize communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for international liberation**

**Escalante 18** – (Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/>)

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: **in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party.** It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for **holding party members accountable**, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, **party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions.** It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct **chauvinist** ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such **accountability is crucial**. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. **The party model** remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that **a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement.** Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

## Case

### 1AC Bayer

#### Active engagement to pressure universities is necessary and recommended to increase diversity in Academia.

1AC Bayer et al. 20 [Amanda Bayer; Professor of Economics @Swarthmore College, Gary A. Hoover; Professor of Economics @ University of Oklahoma, Ebonya Washington; Professor of Economics @ Yale College, “How You Can Work to Increase the Presence and Experience of Black, Latinx, and Native American People in the Economics Profession?”, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.34.3.193]

Conclusion

Economics has a diversity problem. The numbers of Black, Latinx, and Native American economists are low, as is their relative level of satisfaction in the economics profession. Based on surveys and interviews of underrepresented minority economists, both those who are on and those who have exited an economics career trajectory, we have offered ways in which you can help to counter this problem, grouped under the action areas of inform, mentor, and welcome.

As economists, **we recognize** that individuals respond to incentives. Research, teaching, and service are all incentivized, although admittedly to varying degrees. Economists put effort into these activities. The work gets done. But the meager incentives that exist for increasing racial and ethnic diversity across economics have proven insufficient to move the needle. Issuing diversity statements is far from enough. As one PhD economist who is no longer searching for an academic job told us, “I think that there needs to be intensified pressure on economics departments, in particular, to hire people of color. Because **until there is pressure**, I don’t think people are going to change who they’re seeking.” **Forceful incentives** have yet to be applied **around diversity issues**. It is logical to conclude that diversity must not truly be a priority in the economics profession.

### State Turn---1NC

#### Recent Court success proves the law is malleable and can be used for indigenous folk.

Vock 19 [Daniel C. Vock is a Staff Writer for Governing, an organization that focuses on native tribes, “In Tribe v. State Cases, Supreme Court Shifts Support to Native Americans”, 5-23, https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-tribal-rights-supreme-court-ruling-native-americans.html, DOA: 4-14-20] Ian M

The U.S. **Supreme Court** handed the Crow **Tribe** a **major victory** this week in a **long-running** hunting rights **dispute** between the **tribe** and the state of **Wyoming**. This is the second time that the justices have ruled to **enforce tribal** treaty **rights** this year**,** and a third, perhaps **more far-reaching**, case is **still before** the justices. **Until recently**, the **S**upreme **C**ourt was **seen as unsympathetic** to Native American causes. “Every Indian lawyer, expert, close observer cringes every time [the Supreme Court] takes a case,” Joe Valandra, an attorney and member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota once [told](https://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/new-indian-wars-washington-215208) Politico. **But** in both of this year's cases, Justice Neil **Gorsuch**, a conservative appointed by President Donald Trump**, joined** the court’s four **liberals** **in favor** of **Native Americans**. He comes to the court from Colorado, where he often encountered tribal claims as an appeals court judge. “It all seems to **boil down** to Justice Gorsuch and his **view of treaty** interpretation, in particular reading treaties as they would have been understood,” says Forrest **Tahdooahnippah**, an attorney for the Minneapolis firm of Dorsey & Whitney. “**Gorscuch’s willingness** to **look into the historical record** ... has been what has **tipped the scales** in these cases.” The **cases** “are incredibly **significant** both in terms of **tribal sovereignty** and **jurisdiction**,” Valandra tells Governing now. “**Putting tribes** in the **same context** generally **as a state** or as another sovereign is a **major step** forward. And I hope that's what we're seeing here. But I don't know that for sure.” But both of the cases the court ruled on this year deal with treaty interpretation. The court may not be as sympathetic in other types of cases, says Valandra, a former chief of staff of the National Indian Gaming Commission and now the managing director of VAdvisors, a consulting firm. And Gorsuch has recused himself from the third case, adding further uncertainty to its outcome. **Herrera v. Wyoming** In Herrera v. Wyoming, the **court ruled** that the **Crow Tribe’s** off-reservation **hunting rights** that it negotiated with the United States in an **1868 treaty** were **still in effect**. The state of Wyoming, which now covers some of the land that the Crow tribe was given access to, argued unsuccessfully that the tribe’s right to hunt on Wyoming lands ended when Wyoming became a state in 1890. “The Wyoming Statehood Act did not abrogate the Crow Tribe’s hunting right nor did the 1868 Treaty expire of its own accord at that time. The treaty itself defines the circumstances in which the right will expire. Statehood is not one of them,” Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote for the court. The **ruling is a victory** for Clayvin Herrera, a member of the Crow Tribe who was charged with hunting elk off-season and without a license in the Bighorn National Forest in Wyoming, which is adjacent to the Crow Reservation. “The **Crow Tribe** is very, very **gratified** to see the **S**upreme **C**ourt **upheld** its … 1868 **treaty rights** that remains of **vital importance to the survival of the tribe** **to this day**,” says Heather Whiteman Runs Him, an attorney for the Native American Rights Fund who filed a friend-of-the court brief on behalf of the Crow Tribe in the Supreme Court case. “There are resources we depend on. … **This is about** people’s **ability to feed** their **children** in a very **impoverished** and **economically challenged** environment.” The **ruling** could have an even **broader impact** -- **19 tribes** negotiated hunting rights with the federal government in **12 treaties**, according to Lisa Soronen, executive director of the State and Local Legal Center. The high court’s decision is not the end, though. The judges returned the case to lower courts to sort out further details. Under the treaty, for example, the Crow Tribe can enjoy hunting rights in areas that are not “occupied.” The high court determined that Wyoming becoming a state did not automatically mean the entire state was “occupied,” but it left it up to lower courts to decide whether the site where Herrera was hunting was “occupied.” **Washington v. Cougar** Den The Crow Tribe ruling comes just two months after the **Supreme Court** **took** the **side of** the **Yakama Nation** in that tribe's gas tax dispute with the state of Washington. The Yakama argued that the state’s fuel taxes violate a provision of their 1855 treaty that guarantees them the right to travel freely on public highways. A five-justice majority agreed in the case of Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc. **Gorsuch** wrote a special concurrence in that decision, in which he **expressed sympathy** for the Yakama Nation's situation. “Really, this case just tells an old and familiar story,” Gorsuch wrote. “The State of Washington includes millions of acres that the Yakamas ceded to the United States under significant pressure. In return, the government supplied a handful of modest promises. The state is now dissatisfied with the consequences of one of those promises. It is a new day, and now it wants more. But today and to its credit, the court holds the parties to the terms of their deal. It is the least we can do.” The **S**upreme **C**ourt's **rulings** **establish precedents**, and the court's **new approach** toward tribes is likely **to be noticed** by trial judges and appeals courts **across the country.** But the Native American treaty case that the justices are currently reviewing could potentially have an even bigger impact. Carpenter v. Murphy At issue in this case is whether the eastern half of Oklahoma (including Tulsa) is, in effect, still a reservation of the Creek (Muskogee) Tribe. Patrick Murphy, a Creek member, is challenging his murder conviction because, he says, he was wrongfully tried in state court instead of federal court. Federal law requires crimes committed on reservations to be tried in federal court. The Creek, once a powerful tribe in the southeastern United States, were forcibly moved during the 1830s from Alabama and Georgia to what is now Oklahoma. In exchange, the federal government granted the tribe reservation lands in Oklahoma. Murphy claims the federal government never abolished the reservation, even when Oklahoma became a state in 1907. Much of the land, though, eventually did pass from control of Native Americans to whites, often through violence. Gorsuch recused himself from the case, which comes out of the same appeals court where he once served. But many of the justices, including liberal ones, seemed disturbed by the prospect of upending state control over the land. “There are 1.8 million people living in this area,” said Justice Stephen Breyer, a liberal. “They’ve built their lives not necessarily on criminal law but on municipal regulations, property law, dog-related law. And now if we say this land belongs to the tribe, what happens to all those people, all those laws?” A week after the oral arguments, the Supreme Court directed the parties in the case to file further briefs. The questions they wanted answered suggested that “they are looking for creative ways to resolve the dispute,” [wrote](https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/12/justices-call-for-more-briefing-in-dispute-about-oklahoma-prosecutions-of-native-americans/) Ronald Mann, a Columbia University law professor, for SCOTUSblog. If the remaining eight justices on the court split along the same lines they did in the previous two cases, it would end with a 4-4 tie and the lower court's decision -- which held that eastern Oklahoma is still a reservation -- would stand. The court is expected to issue a decision by the end of June. **'Treaties Do Matter'** However the **court rules** in the Oklahoma case, the **two victories** for Native American tribes this year **are significant**, says **Tahdooahnippah**, the Minneapolis lawyer. The Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts was so unsympathetic to Native American causes that advocacy groups urged tribes not to pursue appeals to the high court, to limit the potential for adverse rulings, says Tahdooahnippah. The Roberts court, for example, [ruled](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-399_q86b.pdf) against a Cherokee father in his bid to block the adoption of his daughter by a non-Native American couple. It also ruled against tribes in disputes over treaties and land claims. **Outcomes in future cases** **might be different** with Gorsuch on the court, says Tahdooahnippah. But Tahdooahnippah also thinks **it is significant** that Justice Ruth Bader **Ginsburg**, a liberal stalwart **who has voted against** **tribal claims** in the past, **has joined the majorities** **in** the **last two** **tribal cases.**

#### Antitrust reform is possible, but failure to engage with the state, cedes it to the right.

Cortellessa 21 [Eric Cortellessa is the Investigative Editor of the Washington Monthly, “The Conservatives Out to Stop the New Bipartisan Antitrust Movement”, July/August 2021 issue of Washington Monthly, https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/july-august-2021/the-conservatives-out-to-stop-the-new-bipartisan-antitrust-movement/] IanM

**Last spring**, as the pandemic was taking hold, **Ashley** Baker, a 32-year-old **conservative policy advocate**, noticed a trend that alarmed her: A growing number of Republican elected **officials** were starting to join Democrats in attacking corporate monopolies. Missouri Senator Josh **Hawley** had **introduced** several **bills** to crack down on Big Tech, and **more GOP legislators** were **showing an interest** in doing the same. Texas Senator Ted **Cruz** had **argued** that “**Big Tech is out of control**” and posed a threat to the future of American democracy. Colorado Representative Ken **Buck,** ranking member of the House Antitrust Committee and a former **member of** the **Tea Party**, had **started**[**floating**](https://www.wired.com/story/republicans-serious-big-tech-antitrust-armstrong-buck/?redirectURL=https%253A%252F%252Fwww.wired.com%252Fstory%252Frepublicans-serious-big-tech-antitrust-armstrong-buck%252F) the idea of creating new **regulations for** oligopolistic **corporations**. “I was one of those people that believed that the market could correct itself,” Buck said, “until I saw the cheating.”

At the same time, then President Donald Trump was flailing. His botched response to the coronavirus outbreak was clear, and his approval ratings hit new lows. There was newfound reason to believe that Joe Biden could clinch the White House, and an emerging bipartisan consensus—or something resembling it—on antitrust meant that it could be one of the few areas where the status quo was truly at risk.

**That’s when Baker**, the director of public policy at the Committee for Justice, an outfit that advocates for conservative judicial nominees, had an idea: to **create a** new organization dedicated to pushing a pro-monopoly line on Republicans. Baker aimed for this new group, which would be dubbed the Alliance on Antitrust, **to** align conservatives on the narrowand limited view of **antitrust** that Robert Bork popularized in the 1970s, called the “**consumer welfare standard**.” The late jurist and Yale Law School professor’s argument was that antitrust law was meant strictly to protect consumers from higher prices. **Monopolies**, he argued, often created efficiencies that **led to lower prices** and, therefore, **should generally not be toppled**. Both parties largely accepted the Bork line until a few years ago, **when Democrats**—only a few at first, like Senator Elizabeth Warren, but eventually most—**broke from it**. As **Republicans also started voicing** a **desire to** rein in **monopolies**, **Baker realized** that there needed to be an **infrastructure** that would convince them that monopolies are really not that bad.

“My starting thought was to pull together people who are like-minded on this issue, who I have worked with in some capacity, to come together to try to do something about it, lay down what the conservative position is—that this is what the conservative position on this issue has been for 40 years,” she told me in a recent interview.

The “**like-minded people**” who formed the **new alliance** are a who’s who of Washington’s longtime conservative and libertarian policy activists. They include **Grover Norquist** of Americans for Tax Reform, **Douglas Holtz**-**Eakin** of the American Action Forum, and **David Williams** of the Taxpayers Protection Alliance. In addition, Baker pulled together the heads of a number of other influential groups on the right, like **FreedomWorks**, **Libertas**, the **Goldwater Institute**, the **American Conservative Union**, and more.

Notably, none of these groups had ever before focused much on antitrust, training their energies instead on reducing corporate and personal income tax rates, cutting regulations, and promoting conservative jurists. What they have in common is a keen understanding of the mechanics of Washington governance and influence, a shared history of successfully advancing pro-corporate policies within the GOP coalition, and a sudden sense of vulnerability as **Republican lawmakers** and their constituents **increasingly abandon** those **policies in** favor of right-wing populist attacks on “woke” corporate behavior, including the perceived anti-conservative biases of tech monopolies.

**Baker created** the **Alliance on Antitrust**, a program of the Committee for Justice, **to engage** in the rough-and-tumble of persuading **these elected** officials to return to that traditionally conservative—that is, pro-monopoly—view of antitrust. **She runs** the Alliance’s **day-to-day operations** almost completely on her own: organizing **monthly meetings** with her members and **recruiting them to sign on to letters** when they think Capitol Hill **lawmakers are weighing** an **idea** that they consider outré.

The launch of the Alliance was deliberately timed for last July, when the CEOs of Amazon, Apple, Google, and Facebook testified before Congress. It was just four months before the 2020 election, and partisan tensions were, predictably, high. Yet at those hearings, held by the House antitrust subcommittee, both Democrats and Republicans excoriated Big Tech, albeit for different reasons. Democrat David Cicilline, chairman of the subcommittee, called Google the “gateway to the internet” that had too much monopoly power. Republican Jim Jordan accused the companies of being “out to get conservatives” by censoring right-wing voices, despite there being little evidence at the time to support that claim. Facebook, of course, has been a hotbed of right-wing misinformation, while YouTube algorithms have helped lure users to far-right extremist channels. Those differences aside, members from both sides showed a willingness—indeed, in some cases, an eagerness—to use antitrust enforcement to combat the monopolist corporations that have gained a precarious level of market power as the American economy has become more concentrated than at any other time since the Gilded Age.

That’s when the **Alliance on Antitrust** sprang into action, **putting** out a series of **statements** in **conservative media** **warning Republicans** against the idea. One of the Alliance’s members, Josh **Withrow**, then of FreedomWorks, for example, **told**The **Washington Times** that **expanding the scope of antitrust** enforcement to take on Big Tech would **open a “Pandora’s box** that could have dire consequences throughout our economy.” The group also **sent a letter** to the House antitrust subcommittee making a similar point, arguing that the “economic consequences of many of the recent proposals,” such as creating more stringent merger prohibitions, would “make the American economy and consumers substantially worse off across a wide array of industries.”

As it happens, this professed concern—that cracking down on tech monopolies would punish other industries—aligns with the interests that fund the Alliance and its member organizations. Most of these groups receive financial support from Big Tech—including the Committee for Justice, which gets donations from Google, according to the tech company’s political engagement disclosures—but also from monopolistic corporations in other sectors such as oil and gas, Big Ag, telecom, banking, and pharmaceuticals. These corporations will themselves soon face antitrust enforcement—and potentially major reductions in profits—if something isn’t done now to stop Congress from creating new and stricter laws against companies amassing too much market power.

The emergence of this new conservative antitrust infrastructure owes much to the success of a rival progressive antitrust infrastructure that began a few years earlier, according to Republican insiders. “The organizations and institutions on the left have been very successful at persuading politicians on the left that it’s a winner to go here,” says Joshua Wright, a former federal trade commissioner and a professor at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School. Anti-monopoly groups like the Open Markets Institute and the American Economic Liberties Project, he told me, “have shown politicians that it’s not just a safe but rewarding place to embrace some of these ideas.” Indeed, when Baker’s Alliance was still just getting started last spring, three Democratic senators, Warren, Cory Booker, and Amy Klobuchar, were campaigning in the presidential primary on legislation they’d sponsored to strengthen antitrust laws and enforcement.

Wright has been especially privy to the sea change that’s been happening on the left. For years, he practically occupied the conservative pro-monopoly space on his own. He wrote a famous, some would say infamous, paper derailing “hipster antitrust”—referring to left-wing activists pushing for a crackdown on corporate concentration. And he has gained a reputation in conservative circles as the de facto expert on the subject, often appearing on panel discussions hosted by the Federalist Society and other right-wing think tanks. National Review once said he was “widely considered his generation’s greatest mind on antitrust law.”

Wright’s longtime—um—monopoly on conservative pro-monopoly policy work was due largely to the fact that, for decades, antitrust simply wasn’t a live political issue in Washington. The only real action was at regulatory agencies and the courts, where corporations had to go to gain approval for mergers and acquisitions. Wright is a master of this inside game. At George Mason he runs the law school’s Global Antitrust Institute, which, he told me, specializes in “training judges and antitrust practitioners.” The institute [receives](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/technology/global-antitrust-institute-google-amazon-qualcomm.html?partner=slack&smid=sl-share) major funding from tech behemoths like Google and Amazon as well as the wireless giant Qualcomm. Wright also works as a paid consultant to such companies, like Google, charging, according to ProPublica, more than $500 an hour advising them on how to get mergers approved before the Federal Trade Commission, where he spent several years as a commissioner. Most recently, as the Tech Transparency Project, a research initiative of the watchdog Campaign for Public Accountability, discovered, the FTC’s inspector general reported that Wright improperly lobbied the agency on behalf of Qualcomm. Trump’s Justice Department decided not to prosecute him on those charges; Wright was chosen to lead Trump’s transition on antitrust policy in 2016. The 44-year-old former commissioner told me he did nothing wrong: “My side of the story is that the Department of Justice read the FTC’s inspector general’s report and dismissed and declined to prosecute based on the evidence. Simple as that.”

But now that antitrust has become a major political issue, the inside game is no longer sufficient to protect the interests of corporate oligarchs. Hence the need—which Ashley Baker grasped—for a more public advocacy campaign to keep Republicans from joining the anti-monopoly team. The **Alliance on Antitrust “**has done a **fantastic job** of **bringing in** a lot of disparate groups that are interested in antitrust values and pulling them together with these different perspectives,” Wright said. “Progressives have done a better job **retailing their ideas** while **conservatives watch.”**

Others on the **right** have also seen the **need to** preach the old faith **with** more gusto**.** While Baker was creating the Alliance, Robert Bork Jr., son of the late jurist, established the Bork Foundation to promote his father’s philosophy, with a special focus on antitrust. One of the foundation’s first acts was to republish Bork’s influential 1978 tome, The Antitrust Paradox, which has been out of print for decades.

The concern Baker, Wright, and other **pro-monopoly advocates** have is that **conservative anger** at social media giants will make **antitrust** enforcement **look appealing**, but if those standards are imposed across every sector, it will **change** the American economy as we know it. “Where the rubber hits the road is the minute you get some of these regulatory proposals actually written down on paper—the burdens on mergers legislation will enter, you’re going to rein in certain types of conduct,” a GOP source told me on background. “On the right, they would like to target some of this stuff at tech, right? But the second you go after commerce generally, you hit supermarkets and you hit Caterpillar and you hit Pharma and you hit sort of everybody.”

That argument **may be** the one that resonates most with Republican elected officials, who, on the one hand, may be open to the idea of **supporting antitrust reform** but, **on the other**, know which corporate donors have long been most generous to the party. According to data from the Center for Responsive Politics, the Koch family is a donor to some of the groups in the Alliance on Antitrust through the Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation. They also distribute funds widely among the Republican Party apparatus, such as the Republican National Committee, various conservative think tanks including the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute, and scores of individual candidates. If the Koch family, for instance, sends the clear message that **corporate crackdowns** will have **reverberations beyond Big Tech**, many **GOP lawmakers** will certainly **pay attention.**

Those same **elected officials**, however, are also acutely aware of the swelling tide of populist anger on the right at big companies. That anger has recently reached tsunami-like proportions after major corporations sided with Democrats in opposing state-level Republican efforts to restrict voting rights and after Facebook extended its ban on Donald Trump. The former president not only still controls the party but is also now one of its loudest anti-monopoly voices—even though his administration signed off on tech mergers between AT&T and Time Warner as well as T-Mobile and Sprint.

**Despite** this **pressure**, **longtime** conservative **economic influencers** I spoke with **express faith** in Baker, whom they see as a shrewd policy advocate who can shape GOP opinion on antitrust. “She has really been the leader who has put this all together and has built a new architecture for us to make sure that people really understand the value of the consumer welfare standard and what’s at stake if we abandon a principle that has served us so well for so many years,” said Thomas Schatz, president of Citizens Against Government Waste and a member of the Alliance on Antitrust, referring to the Borkian maxim that antitrust is about prices and not power.

In a way, Baker already has a leg up. As Washington **policy activists** know well, the hardest thing **to do** in this town is to get lawmakers to embrace novel ideas. The status quo is the status quo for a reason—the **deeper** a **policy** or approach **gets into** the government’s **muscle memory,** the **harder it is to eviscerate**. It’s much easier to stop something from happening, especially when the power of corporate money gets involved.

Still, Baker has her work cut out for her. Rage at Big Tech and major corporations is what animates the GOP base at the moment—and the über-powerful corporations that once held the most sway are losing their potency. Thwarting enthusiasm for renewing antitrust may have been easy when it was just the left pushing for the idea. It will be far tougher now that both sides share the same alacrity for ridding these companies of their enormous market power.

In many ways, the battle over antitrust policy is **now a** test of how much mojo the pro-corporate wing of the Republican Party still has—and **Baker** is **calling** every **available** voice and operative **to the ramparts**. “I think it’s fair to say,” Wright told me, “that the space was much lonelier a year or two ago than it is now.”

#### That cements the worst corporate abuses that disproportionately impact people of color AND turns case. (Also, each bill listed is a TVA)

Lee and Chin 21 [Nicol Turner Lee is a Senior Fellow in [Governance Studies](https://www.brookings.edu/program/governance-studies/) at Brookings, and Director for the [Center for Technology Innovation](https://www.brookings.edu/center/center-for-technology-innovation/), and [Caitlin Chin](https://www.brookings.edu/author/caitlin-chin/) is a Research Analyst at the Center for Technology Innovation at The Brookings Institution, “The debate on antitrust reform should incorporate racial equity”, July 8, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/07/08/the-debate-on-antitrust-reform-should-incorporate-racial-equity/] IanM

While those issues are important, the **recent actions** coming **from** the **FTC** and **Congress** should not miss out on the **opportunity** to **address** another aspect of antitrust: racial equity. Since the **potential harms**—both **monetary** and **non-monetary**—that accompany concentrated markets **do not affect all** individuals **equally**, a facially-neutral approach to competition enforcement is **not fair** or **equitable**. Communities of color can suffer grave economic consequences or experience competitive isolation **when products** and **services** are **not offered** or are **disproportionately represented** in their markets. For example, noncompete contracts can **negatively impact Black** and other **workers of color**, especially **post-employment restrictions** that can **increase employer monopsony** **power** in labor markets, and suppress salaries and future earnings. As **another example**, the **rising** number of **mergers** and **acquisitions across the overall** U.S. **economy** may **contribute** to declining startup rates, particularly affecting diverse entrepreneurs **who face outsized** **challenges** to **raising capital** and **accessing credit** for their ventures.

With the growing interest in antitrust—and the granular focus on Big Tech—within Congress and the new administration, racial equity should be positioned as one of the core pillars of any future actions. Toward this goal, the antitrust community should be sensitized to the role of institutional inequities in concentrated markets, considering them when analyzing anticompetitive actions, their outcomes, and associated enforcement actions.

Why racial equity is a competition concern

Under the letter of the law, **antitrust** and **civil rights** are generally **treated as separate** statutes. Yet in practice, their **values intertwine**: Market dominance can effectively **put companies** in a **powerful position** to exacerbate historical racial inequalities. Take the **search engine** **market**, for example, of which **Google controls over 90%.** In 2012, Harvard professor Latanya **Sweeney** discovered that Google **searches** for individuals with **Black-sounding names** were more likely to **generate advertisements** for **arrest records** than **searches** for individuals **with white-sounding names**—even if no arrest records actually existed. This **flawed system** could result in significant emotional, reputational, or financial harm for **racially-stereotyped individuals**, as well as amplifythe profiling **associated with** algorithmic **biases**. The lack of competition in the online **search industry** not only **eliminates consumers’** **options** to **choose a different**, **less-biased** search **engine,** but also **reduces** market **incentives** for Google **to improve** its **biased algorithms**, as was [recently illustrated by](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/03/ai-researcher-timnit-guru-says-shes-been-fired-from-google.html) the dismissal of the former technical co-lead of Google’s Ethical Artificial Intelligence Team, Timnit Gebru.

**Large technology companies** also routinely **collect massive** **volumes of data** about people, compounded in scale through mergers and acquisitions. **Using this** data, **they can** surveil selected populations for online **behavioral advertising** or micro-interactions based on known or inferred attributes. In this sense, advertisers choose which communities can see or **do not see** their ads—either **through** the direct targeting of **demographic variables** like age, gender, **sexual orientation**, or **race**, or through “proxy variables” like **zip code**, **education**, **interests**, and **purchase history**. **These activities** can disproportionately impact marginalized communities who may be **shown different**[**employment**](https://www.brookings.edu/research/assessing-employer-intent-when-ai-hiring-tools-are-biased/), [**credit card**](https://qz.com/1733345/the-fight-against-discriminatory-financial-ads-on-facebook/)**s**, [**housing**](https://www.brookings.edu/research/ethical-algorithm-design-should-guide-technology-regulation/), and other advertisements based on the platform or advertising algorithm. More concerning, companies like **Google**, **Amazon**, **Apple**, and **Facebook** have each **engaged in activities** that have **cemented** their respective **market power**, allowing them to continue to wield control over the **advertisements** which their hundreds of millions of users **see.**

Including equity as a goal in antitrust enforcement

Last year, then-acting **FTC Chair** Rebecca Kelly **Slaughter** put forward an argument that U.S. **enforcement agencies** should consider antitrust statutes as “a tool for combatting structural racism” by **prioritizing competition** enforcement in highly **concentrated industries** where **people of color** are **marginalized**. These **enforcement decisions** are especially consequential given the **resource constraints** that federal antitrust agencies **face**. According to Michael Kades of the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, appropriations for the FTC and Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) decreased 18% from 2010 to 2018 when adjusting for inflation. These **constraints force** federal enforcement **agencies to choose** which antitrust **actions to pursue** or abstain from; each active choice potentially impacts marginalized communities within the related sector.

It is **possible** that some of the newly introduced House legislation could offer an opportunity to advance racial equity **by** further **expanding** the parameters of **competition enforcement**. For example, the Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act could **increase funding** for federal **antitrust enforcers**—potentially allowing for **more litigation** capacity in situations where **anticompetitive behavior**, directly or indirectly, **harms marginalized groups** or **contributes** to algorithmic **biases**. The Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching (**ACCESS**) Act could **require** applicable platforms to offer **data portability** and interoperability options, potentially **giving users** greater **flexibility** to **stop using** a **platform** with **biased** or discriminatory **algorithmic outcomes**. The American Innovation and Choice Online Act, Platform Competition and Opportunity Act, and Ending Platform Monopolies Act could each **introduce new restrictions** on mergers and acquisitions and prohibit certain **anticompetitive behaviors** by large platforms, **including** those that may imperil civil rights. But, to ensure leveled pursuits of markets that are both competitive and antiracist, more granular discussions about racial equity and inclusion must take place in parallel with these overarching antitrust reforms.

### A2: Aff

#### Settler political grammars can be tactically repurposed – refusal on behalf of all natives is racist romanticism – alt precludes concrete change.

Rosenow 19—Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Oxford Brookes University (Doerthe, “Decolonising the Decolonisers? Of Ontological Encounters in the GMO Controversy and Beyond,” Global Society, 33:1, 82-99, dml)

Despite the force and importance of this argument, I have felt slightly uneasy when reading those conclusions. Focusing on radical ontological difference can easily lead to a romanticised reification of other peoples’ difference that is in danger of ignoring actual political struggles and demands on the ground. As Cusicanqui argues, those struggles might very well emerge out of an “indigenous modernity”, rather than an insistence on the right to one’s difference. By this she means that some Indigenous people aim to formulate a hegemonic vision for how to structure a society that is valid for everyone (Indigenous AND non-Indigenous): they work for a society that is in their “image and likeness”, and to use modern notions such as “citizenship” for this purpose, rather than rejecting the latter as irreconcilable with one’s own world.39 By contrast, some North American Indigenous intellectuals call for an Indigenous “resurgence” that, rather than seeking hegemony, altogether turns away from seeking recognition by wider (colonial) “society”. As Leanne Betasamosake Simpson points out, in such “resurgent mobilization … there is virtually no room for white people”. 40 But my unease was also emerging from something else, which is what I want to focus on in this article: the problem that encounters and conflicts are yet again made sense of within overarching structures of knowledge production rather than cultivation (despite the intention to do otherwise). As de la Cadena herself makes clear in the quotation above, what is encountered as “different” is inevitably described “in forms that I could understand” (my emphasis)—even whilst simultaneously recognising that one’s description does not capture what the encountered practices actually do. Sense-making, for de la Cadena, takes place at what could be called two levels: At a first level, there is the inevitable process of making sense of an alienating affective experience on the spot, from within one’s own framework of understanding the world. At a second level, then, de la Cadena attempts to make legible her grappling and not-understanding in the context of a book for an academically literate and interested audience—in other words, in the writing-up of her ethnographic research. In Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s case, given that their articles do not aim to make an empirical contribution, sense-making takes place at what could be called a third level: what is drawn upon is the understanding that emerged out of the ethnographic work of others, which is brought into conversation with various bodies of theoretical work in order to make a conceptual contribution. This takes place via the coining of central concepts and the outlining of all-encompassing frameworks that are meant to help us understand the analytical, normative and political consequences of their argument for scholarly work more broadly. The ontological encounters of others are used to delineate the merits of ontological encounters in general, in IR and beyond. This objective leads to a particular way of developing and structuring a generic argument that makes it difficult to move beyond sense-making frameworks that are necessarily geared towards settling all those unsettling and disconcerting experiences that were the focus of the articles in the first place. This is also the problem of some central decolonial work. Drawing on Edouard Glissant, Mignolo, for example, critiques the “requirement of transparency” that forms the basis for understanding in Western social science scholarship. He argues for the “right to opacity” of those located on the other side of the colonial difference.41 But this claim sits at odds with his simultaneous desire to write a new, all-encompassing history of “the modern/colonial world system”. 42 And like in Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s articles, terms such as “pluriversality”43 or “diversality”44 are coined in order to have a (one!) concept for a similarly all-encompassing solution to domination. While de la Cadena is critical of her own “anxiety to understand coherently (with which I meant clearly and without contradiction”), and while she points out how this “was often out of place”, 45 Mignolo as well as Rojas and Blaney and Tickner seek to place such anxiety in yet another coherent framework that holds everything together. The question arises whether this can be any different in scholarly work that is not directly based on ethnographic research itself, and which can therefore not lay claim to a direct experience of ontological controversies. This has become an important question for my own (likewise third-level) work on anti-GMO activism. My work to date has primarily aimed at making a conceptual contribution, and has relied on a conversation between the ethnographic research of others and various bodies of conceptual work, including decolonial and “ontological turn” literature.46 But as I have already indicated in relation to de la Cadena’s work, when writing up their research for academic purposes, even those who have directly experienced ontological encounters find it hard to resist the tendency to conclude their work with stringent, overarching, coherent conclusions that the Westerneducated reader can grasp and “take home”. In the next section, I will draw on two anthropological ethnographic texts that are significant for research on the GMO controversy to show how this works. The two texts that will be analysed in the next section engage with the GMO controversy in Paraguay and Mexico respectively, and they have stood out for me in the way they manage to convey a sense of unease and grappling with ontological encounters and conflicts. However, as the next section will show, they as well end up providing a framework and conclusions that can accommodate and make sense of the encountered ontological difference. 3. Ontological Encounters in the GMO Controversy According to Susana Carro-Ripalda and Marta Astier, much of the research that is carried out in relation to the question of what smallholder producers in the Global South truly think of (and say about) agricultural biotechnology is unable to grasp the “ontological incompatibility” that exists between the experienced human/nonhuman relations in small-scale agriculture on the one hand, and the logic that underlies genetic engineering (GE) on the other.47 This is precisely because most social research is itself grounded in the crucial modern/colonial nature-culture divide: the former can only be known through scientific means, while the latter can be known through the study of social/cultural/political practices. Knowledge about nature is about establishing “facts”, which are either true or false (i.e. nature as “one” is either correctly or incorrectly represented), while knowledge about culture is about studying meaning, which is necessarily (due to the existence of different cultures) multiple. The question of whether GMOs do or do not pose a “factual” danger consequently lies outside of the remit of the social sciences, which therefore focus on the social dimension of statements that are made about nature. But as Kregg Hetherington’s reflections on his own anthropological research journey in Paraguay make clear, this tacit signing-up to modern ontology can lead to difficulties in understanding the reality of the people one is interested in.48 Coming from a position in which he took for granted the scientific distinction between (proven) “fact” and “error”, Hetherington explains how he “translate[d]” the claims of the leader of a local peasant movement49 (Antonio) about the truth of (GM) soy “killer beans” into something else: Until this point, I had approached ethnography as an extended discussion with and about humans, and I was less interested in beans than I was with what Antonio said about them … To be blunt, Antonio kept pointing at the beans, and I kept looking at him … I was comfortable saying that this was a figure of speech, a kind of political rhetoric, or even to claim that this is what Antonio believed, all of which explicitly framed ‘la soja mata’ (soy kills) as data for social analysis, rather than analysis itself worthy of response.50 However, Hetherington points out that not believing in the truth of the killer bean did not prevent him from “participating in Antonio’s knowledge practices”. 51 Becoming involved in the anti-soy bean activism of the peasants, Hetherington became “part of the situation” that made the killer bean turn into a crucial agent in a court case that was brought against two soy farmers for the murder of two activist peasants. As a result, killer beans became transformed into a matter of national concern. Crucially for Hetherington, participation involved more than joining the situation in spite of his lack of belief: it led to him becoming immersed in a relation with both peasants and beans that started to have a physical impact on him—in de la Cadena’s words, he indeed became “partially connected”: 52 Beans didn’t scare me at first. Indeed, as a foreigner to the situation that gives rise to killer beans (a Canadian no less), giant fields of soy were a familiar, even a comforting sight. But it took only a few months with Antonio for me to start feeling the menace from those fields. Soon, the sweetish smell of glyphosate, recently applied, and especially the corpselike smell of 2, 4-D mixed with Tordon, could ruin my appetite and make me expect to see people emerge from their homes to show me pustules on their legs and stomachs.53 Similar observations are also found in Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s contribution to the 2014 Agriculture and Human Values symposium on the challenges of making smallholder producer voices being heard in relation to agricultural biotechnology.54 While most of the contributions to the symposium concentrate on how to tease out smallholders’ “real” voices in the most effective way, Carro-Ripalda and Astier critically reflect on their own perceived failure to become knowledgeable about smallholders’ voices in their research on GM maize cultivation in Mexico. It was through ethnographic fieldwork in rural areas in Central Mexico, in-depth structured interviews, focus groups, participant observation and, finally, a National Workshop in Mexico City with over 50 stakeholders (including smallholder producers) that Carro-Ripalda and Astier attempted to get a better sense of what the actual voices of peasants in the GM controversy were trying to convey.55 However, particularly the final workshop, which aimed to create conditions under which Mexican smallholder producers could speak on their own terms about GM maize cultivation, “unwittingly reproduced the conditions of exclusive, techno-scientific and regulatory spaces”. 56 The public discourse that centres on questions of safety, science, possibilities of regulation and problems of potential contamination, and which is upheld by both GM maize proponents and antiGMO activists, dominated the workshop debate. Even when present smallholders raised different concerns, the discussion always returned to the previous, main ones, as if those who had spoken differently “had not spoken at all”. The way that smallholders could articulate “their perceptions, ideas, and desires” was thereby “severely limited”. 57 Carro-Ripalda and Astier are focused on the dominance of one particular (techno-scientific, regulatory) discourse that, they maintain, disabled smallholder voices engaged in different discourses from speaking up or, when speaking, from being heard. In other words, smallholders were unable to adequately represent their own understanding of what is at stake in the GM maize controversy in Mexico. Considering what I have pointed out in the previous section, based on Rojas, difference is thereby transformed into an epistemological, rather than an ontological one: Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s argument is implicitly based on the assumption that, under the right conditions, difference can be translated into something that can be communicated to, and discussed with, other stakeholders. But the term “ontological incompatibility” that the authors themselves use indicates there is something else at play, which cannot easily be translated: the nature of the relation of smallholder producers to their “land, seed, crop, climate … as told and understood by themselves”; the “central place” that Maize continues to occupy in Mesoamerican pre-Hispanic cosmology, and “the social and cultural significance” that goes along with that.58 Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s emphasis on the problem of the dominant discourse, and the overarching Mexican structures of domination this discourse is related to (such as the “neoliberal vision of the Mexican agricultural future”59), makes it occasionally difficult to understand what the problem of “ontological incompatibility” really is about. At the end of the article, the place of the smallholder producers whom they have engaged seems once again clearly delineated and knowable: at stake for smallholders are, Carro-Ripalda and Astier argue, “their lives as maize cultivators, their pride in their craft and knowledge, and their ceremonially demanded right to information, choice and access to their ‘own resources’”. It is not just about “retaining ‘traditional’ ways of agriculture”, as the anti-GMO movement maintains, but also about claiming “political, economic and socio-cultural rights.”60 Though this certainly adds a significant dimension to the debate, it indeed simply seems to add to, rather than radically challenge, the frameworks that are conventionally used in the anti-GMO debate, as well as the frameworks that focus on how to bring out and represent other people’s “voices” in a better way. Is this simply unavoidable when it comes to the production of academic knowledge through/in academic writing? As already indicated in the previous section, academic writing pursues by definition the objective of enhancing knowledge and providing improved insight into a certain situation. In its very structure, an academic piece of work aims to resolve and settle, rather than to dislocate, to destabilise, or to provide discomfort. Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s article is meant to render legible their own encounter of ontological difference for an academic audience. Is it possible for the reader to dig below these representational strategies, and to relate more directly to their encounter of what they themselves call ontological incompatibility? And which has led them to brand their final workshop, in a quite un-academic way, as a “failure”? There are a few places in the article in which their inability to put into words and arguments all of “the complexity of experiences, relations and reasons that bind people to maize”61 is more obvious. Becoming attuned to this complexity is linked to the authors having to become at least “partially connected”—to yet again use de la Cadena’s phrase—to the relations they attempt to trace. It is interesting, for example, that Carro-Ripalda and Astier talk about “voices” as going beyond the semantic level, as conveying something acoustically, and as requiring a form of listening that shies away from asking pre-given questions. It is also interesting that some of that took place when they literally walked together with their interlocutors; precisely as it is emphasised by Blaney and Tickner:62 Despite the shortcomings of the workshop … we felt that that, through our research on the ground, we had engaged with male and female farmers, heard about their perspectives on GM and their visions of a rural future, and accompanied them to work in milpas and markets. So, what do smallholder farmers’ voices sound like? What meanings did they convey to us? We will provide here but a few of those sounds and meanings … 63 Despite returning to the idea of voices as conveying “meaning” in this quote, meaning is related to sounds, to walking together, to particular places with their own sounds, smells, and colours. The sample of actual “voices” Carro-Ripalda and Astier then choose to present yet again invoke an intricate sense of the relationality of farmers and nonhumans: It is a joy to plant, getting hold of the maize, of a beautiful cob which is pleasant, to go to the harvest, to look at pretty cobs, all regular. Because this is what sustains me. You can see the difference in the seeds straight away … You need to look at the cob and as soon as I grab it I see the difference. It is the person who knows the seed the one who chooses it [for replanting the following year].64 By contrast, GM maize is associated by the smallholders whom Carro-Ripalda and Astier cite with feelings of “artificiality, estrangement and distrust towards the created object (the GMO) in itself, not only because of deep ontological considerations … but because of the political and economic motives which are ‘assembled’ into it.”65 Although the authors make a distinction between ontology and politics/ economics here, their invoking of the “assemblage” precisely shows how the latter becomes part of ontology itself, and then (as in the case of Hetherington) impacts on the sensual, bodily connection with the maize. Understanding the relation between “things” in this way allows for an analysis of power and domination that has at least the potential of moving beyond pre-given frameworks; strategically suspending them in order to “sharpen [the] analysis of exactly how power operates, how relations are made and undermined, and with what consequences”. 66 Genetically modified maize is a problem because it is part of particular Mexican neoliberal visions and strategies, but in the context outlined by Carro-Ripalda and Astier, that vision is not only (and not even primarily) made sense of through given frames of knowledge, such as Marxist theories of the exploitation of labour, but sensually, through the way it disrupts the (physical) pleasure and joy that has sustained the farmer-maize-assemblage so far.67 GM technology externalises the maize from farmers and estrange them from their ways of life; and it is only through this externalisation that GM maize becomes perceivable as a potential source of “contamination”, as a danger against which farmers need to “defend” their seeds.68 Now, some might counter that the previous paragraph in practice only provides a fancy repackaging of the two well-rehearsed arguments brought forward by many anti-GMO activists: (a) that the problem of GMOs is an intrinsic property that makes it “unsafe” (which activists try to scientifically prove), and/or (b) that the fundamental problem of agricultural biotechnology is that it estranges farmers from their traditional, ancestral way of life, that it allows for their exploitation, and that it provides a further foothold for neoliberal visions of how the world should be ordered. Both arguments are grounded in modern ontology: the first goes down the route of science (contesting “facts” about the “nature” of GMOs on the basis of science itself), while the second goes down the “social” route by either making a case for the need to respect cultural multiplicity, or for the need to prevent economic exploitation. Some activists make use of all of these routes and arguments. Famous environmental activist and intellectual Vandana Shiva, for example, determines the alienating character of the GMO to be an intrinsic property, while at the same time depicting smallholder producers as intrinsic “‘reservoirs’ of local or indigenous knowledge or as ‘natural’ conservators of biodiversity through their traditional practices”. 69 According to Carro-Ripalda and Astier, this “unwittingly reinforce[es] images of smallholder producers as passive, timeless and voiceless.”70 This leads to precisely the sort of romanticised reification of “difference” that I have critiqued in the previous section of this article—paradoxically, in this case, on the basis of an ontology that is deeply modern, as it regards both “things” and “people” as ontologically stable and classifiable. By contrast, the authors of the two texts I have analysed in this section trace ontological encounters that cannot be contained by the nature/culture dichotomy. There is no pre-given (social) theory of neoliberalism and global power relations that dictates how the “voice” of the farmer needs to be made sense of. There is also no pregiven understanding of the “factual” (scientific) nature of GMOs. The notion of radical difference that comes up in these two texts emerged from precisely the “misunderstandings” that the encounter of ethnographers with “other people” and their relations brought to the fore; but importantly, it did not make any clearer to the ethnographer what the “stuff” that grounded the misunderstandings is actually composed of.71 Yet, somewhat paradoxically, despite all this emphasis on misunderstandings, incompatibility, grappling, failure, and critical self-reflection of one’s own assumptions—at the end of the day what is left for the readers (at least if they do not explicitly focus on the “ethnographic excess” found in the writings) is the impression that they know more about “stuff” than they did before: that they understand the situation better, that new knowledge has been produced, that the object of analysis is more transparent than it has been before. How can this subjugation of the encountered ontologically difference to academic strategies of comprehensive sense-making avoided (if at all)? This article itself is now coming up to what would normally be a conclusion—i.e. the treacherous waters of nailing its contribution to knowledge. Given that this article is yet again another “third-level” engagement with questions of ontology and decoloniality, the question is whether there is any way to avoid this pull of hegemonic modes of academic knowledge production. Rather than providing a conclusion and reiterate the core argument that the article has made, I will attempt to finish this piece by raising even more questions, and by providing some further reflections. 4. Turtles all the Way Down: (Further) Reflections on What Questions to Ask The pull of hegemonic systems of academic knowledge production is difficult to avoid. This is the case even in writings that are directly based on ontological encounters and controversies, and that reflect on the displacement that encountering different ontologies has entailed. But as I have indicated, this problem is even more pronounced in writings—like my own—that provide what I have previously called “third-level” sense-making of ontological encounters. The contribution of third-level analysis is usually a conceptual one, which makes it by definition veer towards the general and abstract rather than the concrete. In relation to the literature on decolonial thought and the ontological turn, this becomes manifest in three different (yet interrelated) ways: first, in the desire to provide an understanding of ontology that enables a conceptualisation of the former as multiple. Drawing on the work of Mario Blaser and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro respectively, Rojas and Blaney and Tickner argue that ontology can be thought of as multiple if reality is understood as always being “enacted” or “performed”. 72 This is what Blaser calls an understanding of ontology as “materialsemiotic”: one that defines reality as “always in the making through the dynamic relations of hybrid assemblages”. 73 Pinpointing it like this is inevitably geared towards answering the question of what reality as such, in general is about. Secondly, there is an ambition to coin the general normative-political project that arises out of this understanding with a singular concept, such as the pluriverse. Thirdly, arguments about ontological multiplicity and the emancipatory-decolonial political projects that arise out of its recognition are written for an audience of a particular discipline, such as IR: the aim is to provide a wholesale, general rethinking, or, indeed, “reconstruction” of the latter.74 What sort of questions drive conceptual work into that direction, and what desire “to know” underlies the questions? According to Cherokee philosopher Brian Yazzie Burkhart, for Native Americans “the questions we choose to ask are more important than any truths we might hope to discover in asking such questions”. 75 By contrast, Western knowledge is always (at least in the mainstream) propositional knowledge: “knowledge of the form ‘that something is so’”. Here, knowledge cannot be verified by referring to direct experiences: “there must be something underlying them and justifying them”. 76 Burkhart gives the example of the “routine response” given by “Western people” to Indigenous accounts of creation: “In [one] account, the earth rests on the back of a turtle. The Western response to this account is simply the question, ‘What holds the turtle?’” This question makes no sense to the Native storyteller, because the truth of the story lies in the paths to rightful action that it outlines, rather than what it has to say about the “reality” of the world. But when the Westerner insists on the question, the answer finally is: “‘Well, then there must be turtles all the way down’.”77 Equating Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s work with European mainstream (hence analytic) philosophy seems, at first glance, incredibly unfair. After all, those authors precisely advocate the cultivating of knowledge by direct awareness or acquaintance in exactly the way that Burkhart identifies as typical for Native Americans. But on the other hand, the framework that circumscribes their emphasis on the need for “concreteness” is still an abstract one that wants to answer the question of how things really are and should be: enacted, performed, pluriversal, … The point is not whether this argument about reality and politics is right or wrong. The point is to recognise that it is driven by particular questions that might make no sense in the context of other intelligence systems, but that need to be addressed in an academic article in order to make a conceptual argument compelling, convincing and original for an audience that primarily sits (whether it likes it or not) within a Western, colonial, hegemonic system of knowledge production.78 And even when the contribution to knowledge production is not primarily conceptual, as in the “second-level” work that I have analysed in the previous section in relation to the GMO controversy, the final argument that is made (e.g. about peasants’ economic and cultural rights) is yet again lucid and comprehensible to an audience that seeks to comprehend “stuff” within modern parameters. Where to go from here (particularly as a white, European scholar)? As suggested by Tucker, one way might be to engage in much more direct, ethnographic research, which would enable more direct experience of ontological encounters. Despite previously-mentioned problems of even that research not going far enough, there is without doubt more space for providing a sense of grappling and dislocation if the originality of a piece of work is not purely grounded in the conceptual contribution it aims to make. However, not every scholar is able— body-, context- or funding-wise—to spend extensive periods of time in different places, and the ethical and political pitfalls of researching “radical difference” through fieldwork with—but often rather on—others have been pointed out by Indigenous scholars numerous times.79 But even for those unable or unwilling to do more primary, empirical research, there is space to push the boundaries of what can and should be written about (and how). For decades there have been attempts to provide “innovative” platforms, for example at conferences, to talk about “stuff” in different ways (e.g. through storytelling or artistic practices; not at least by e.g. Indigenous peoples themselves80). However, these “innovations” are still at the margins, and they will most likely never be able to compete with acknowledged knowledge production outlets such as journal articles and scholarly books. But even within the latter, there is always at least some space to push for more open-endedness, more reflection on the author’s embodied positionality, more auto-critique, more uncertainty and grappling (even if this is based on reading about the ontological encounters of others). Although this sort of embodied self-reflection on a writer’s “situatedness” (which in my own case means being “on the colonising side of a divide”81) has obviously been advanced by many critical scholars for decades (including feminists and post- as well as decolonial scholars), this article has hopefully shown that there is still (always) a need to go further, in order to more fundamentally challenge hegemonic, modern/colonial modes of knowledge production. The sense of unease that I have outlined in section two was particularly strong when reading conclusions that were geared towards making recommendations for the discipline of IR, or for “international politics”, as such. Aiming to make generic conclusions for entire disciplines, political fields, or global “issues” pushes the generality and abstraction of a contribution even further away from an advocacy of the concrete. Why, and to whom, does it matter whether IR, as a discipline, or international politics, as object of study, becomes more pluriversal or not? What are the actual benefits of the concept of the pluriverse in the first place? Or to pick up the theme of this special issue: why does it matter whether IR is, or should move into, a mode of affirmation rather than critique?82 Why is this a good question to ask—and for whom? This is not just a theoretical problem, but it has real-life consequences for actually-existing decolonial struggles. The desire for making a generic argument about relational ontologies and a pluriversal politics harbours the danger of making a huge variety of demands and struggles that often exist in tension and contradiction with each other commensurable. Indigenous demands for the repatriation of “their” land might be at odds with the social justice demands for redistribution and “the commons”. 83 For Blaney and Tickner, decolonial thought is commensurable with not just the ontological turn literature, but also feminist and other critical interventions.84 Mignolo and Arturo Escobar advocate a transnational fight for global justice and are enthusiastic about the potential of global movements to achieve that aim together.85 Like Mignolo, Rojas explicitly draws on the World Social Forum slogan “Another world is possible” as well as the Zapatistas slogan of “a world where many words fit” to make her case about the need for a pluriversal understanding of emancipatory-decolonial politics.86 While it can be argued that this problem of seeing all these struggles and demands as commensurable goes back to a lack of actual engagement with particular decolonial practices and battles, what I have argued in this article is that it is also related to the problem of how and what sort of knowledge is produced and valued in the Western academy: knowledge that is abstract, generic, and applicable beyond a specific context. Knowledge that is driven by the desire to know what is. Knowledge that desires to know what holds the turtle—all the way down.

#### State engagement is possible, but refusal reifies acquiescence to subtler settler power.

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The prescription for decolonisation—that is, a normative project committed to the liberation of the colonised and the overturning of colonial relationships of power (Kohn & McBride, 2011: 3)—is indeed one of the most counterhegemonic implications of the settler colonial paradigm as applied to IsraelPalestine, potentially shifting it from a diagnostic frame to a prognostic one which offers a ‘proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack’ (Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). What, however, does the settler colonial paradigm offer by way of envisioning decolonisation? As Veracini (2007) notes, while settler colonial studies scholars have sought to address the lack of attention paid to the experiences of Indigenous peoples in conventional historiographical accounts of decolonisation (which have mostly focused on settler independence and the loosening of ties to the ‘motherland’), there is nevertheless a ‘narrative deficit’ when it comes to imagining settler decolonisation. While Veracini (2007) relates this deficit to a matter of conceptualisation, it is apparent that the structural perspective of the paradigm in many ways closes down possibilities of imagining the type of social and political transformation to which the notion of decolonisation aspires. In this regard, there is a worrying tendency (if not tautological discrepancy) in settler colonial studies, where the only solution to settler colonialism is decolonisation—which a faithful adherence to the paradigm renders largely unachievable, if not impossible.

To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to return to Wolfe’s (2013a: 257) account of settler colonialism as guided by a ‘zero-sum logic whereby settler societies, for all their internal complexities, uniformly require the elimination of Native alternatives’. The structuralism of this account has immense power as a means of mapping forms of injustice and indignity as well as strategies of resistance and refusal, and Wolfe is careful to show how transmutations of the logic of elimination are complex, variable, discontinuous and uneven. Yet, in seeking to elucidate the logic of elimination as the overarching historical force guiding settler-native relations there is an operational weakness in the theory, whereby such a logic is simply there, omnipresent and manifest even when (and perhaps especially when) it appears not to be; the settler colonial studies scholar need only read it into a situation or context. It thus hurtles from the past to the present into the future, never to be fully extinguished until the native is, or until history itself ends. There is thus a powerful ontological (if not metaphysical) dimension to Wolfe’s account, where there is such thing as a ‘settler will’ that inherently desires the elimination of the native and the distinction between the settler and native can only ever be categorical, founded as it is on the ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ (2013a: 258). It is here that the differences between earlier settler colonial scholarship on Israel-Palestine and the recent settler colonial turn come into clearest view. While Jamal Hilal’s (1976) Marxist account of the conflict, for instance, engaged Palestinians and Jewish Israelis in terms of their relations to the means of production, Wolfe’s account brings its own ontology: the bourgeoisie/proletariat distinction becomes that of settler/native, and the class struggle the struggle between settler, who seeks to destroy and replace the native, and native, who can only ever push back. Indeed, if the settler colonial paradigm views history in similar teleological terms to the Marxist framework, it does not offer the same hopeful vision of a liberated future. After all, settler colonialism has only one story to tell—‘either total victory or total failure’ (Veracini, 2007).

Veracini’s attempt to disaggregate different forms of settler decolonisation is revealing of the difficulties that come along with this zero-sum perspective. It is significant to note that beyond settler evacuation (which may decolonise territory, he cautions, but not necessarily relationships) the picture he paints is a relatively bleak one. For Veracini (2011: 5), claims for decolonisation from Indigenous peoples in settler societies can take two broad forms: an ‘anticolonial rhetoric expressing a demand for indigenous sovereign independence and self-determination… and an “ultra”-colonial one that seeks a reconstituted partnership with the [settler state] and advocates a return to a relatively more respectful middle ground and “treaty” conditions’. While both, he suggests, are tempting strategies in the struggle for change, though ‘ultimately ineffective against settler colonial structures of domination’ (2011: 5), it is the latter strategy that invites Veracini’s most scathing assessment. As he writes,

under settler colonial conditions the independent polity is the settler polity and sanctioning the equal rights of indigenous peoples has historically been used as a powerful weapon in the denial of indigenous entitlement and in the enactment of various forms of coercive assimilation. This decolonisation actually enhances the subjection of indigenous peoples… it is at best irrelevant and at worst detrimental to indigenous peoples in settler societies (2011: 6-7).

The ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ plays a particularly ambivalent role in Veracini’s (2011: 6) formulation, where the categorical distinction between settler and native obstructs the ‘possibility of a genuinely decolonised relationship’ (by virtue of its lopsidedness) yet is a necessary political strategy to guard against the absorption of Indigenous people into the settler fold, which would represent settler colonialism’s final victory. The battle here is between a ‘settler colonialism [that] is designed to produce a fundamental discontinuity as its “logic of elimination” runs its course until it actually extinguishes the settler colonial relation’ and an anti-colonial struggle that ‘must aim to keep the settler-indigenous relationship going’ (2011: 7). In other words, the categorical distinction produced by the frontier must be maintained in order to struggle against its effects. Given the lack of options presented to Indigenous peoples by Veracini (2014: 315), his conclusion that settler decolonisation demands a ‘radical, post-settler colonial passage’ is perhaps not surprising – although he has ‘no suggestion as to how this may be achieved and [is] pessimistic about its feasibility’.

Scholars have long reckoned with the ambivalence of the settler colonial situation, which is simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, colonising and decolonising (Curthoys, 1999: 288). Given the generally dreadful Fourth World circumstances facing many Indigenous peoples in settler societies, it could be argued that there is good reason for such pessimism. The settler colonial paradigm, in this sense, offers an important caution against celebratory narratives of progress. Wolfe (1994), it must be recalled, wrote the original articulation of his thesis precisely against the idea of ‘historical rupture’ that dominated in Australia post-Mabo, and was thus as much a scholarly intervention as it was a political challenge to the idea of Australia having broken with its colonial past. Nonetheless, the fatalism of the settler colonial paradigm—whereby decolonisation is by and large put beyond the realms of possibility—has seen it come under considerable critique for reifying settler colonialism as a transhistorical meta-structure where colonial relations of domination are inevitable (Macoun & Strakosch, 2013: 435; Snelgrove et al., 2014: 9). Not only does Wolfe’s ontology erase contingency, heterogeneity and (crucially) agency (Merlan, 1997; Rowse, 2014), but its polarised framework effectively ‘puts politics to death’ (Svirsky, 2014: 327). In response to such critiques, Wolfe (2013a: 213) suggests that ‘the repudiation of binarism’ may just represent a ‘settler perspective’. However, as Elizabeth Povinelli (1997: 22) has astutely shown, it is in this regard that the totalising logic of Wolfe’s structure of invasion rests on a disciplinary gesture where ‘any discussion which does not insist on the polarity of the [settler] colonial project’ is assimilationist, worse still, genocidal in effect if not intent. Any attempt to ‘explore the dialogical or hybrid nature of colonial subjectivity’—which would entail working beyond the bounds of absolute polarity—is disciplined as complicit in the settler colonial project itself, leaving ‘the only nonassimilationist position one that adheres strictly and solely to a critique of [settler] state discourse’. This gesture not only disallows the possibility of counter-publics and strategic alliances (even limited ones), but also comes dangerously close to ‘resistance as acquiescence’ insofar as the settler colonial studies scholar may malign the structures set in play by settler colonialism, but only from a safe distance unsullied by the messiness of ambivalences and contradictions of settler and Native subjectivities and relations. Opposition is thus left as our only option, but, as we know from critical anti-colonial and postcolonial scholarship, opposition in itself is not decolonisation.

### A2: Brough

#### Decolonizing the academy from within debate is impossible without taking responsibility for debate’s dialogical form. Theorizing indigenous perspectives is not enough—contextualizing those perspectives to particular demands, defending their consequences, and submitting them to oppositional testing are all prerequisites to decolonial praxis.

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It is important to note that when we talk about indigenous peoples' relationship with their lands, it is not a question of whether an individual may or may not have a relationship with her or his environment. Obviously, it is important to distinguish between a philosophy or a worldview and individual thinking and behaviour which may not always reflect or comply with the former. Moreover, my intention here is not to evoke the stereotype of 'ecological Indian' or any other variety of the Noble Savage, but to consider how certain aspects of indigenous life philosophies can inform our rethinking the notion of responsibility and how that could be applied in endeavours aimed at decolonizing and transforming the hegemonic academy characterized by sanctioned epistemic ignorance. In the context of rapid corporatization of the academy, there is a pressing need to envision alternatives that oppose the destructive agendas affecting all of us. The pervasive nature of neoliberal corporate mentality is also reflected in the (willy-nilly) adoption of its values such as the externalization of social responsibility by many academics. It seems that the ethos and values of corporations and consumer culture are increasingly influencing the academy. In the former, social responsibility is considered a distortion of business principles (Bakan, 2004, p. 35), whereas in the latter, "we are actively prevented from exercising care and living in ecologically-embedded and responsible ways" (Plumwood, 2002, p. 16). As a result, we have academics, including many 'revolutionary scholars,' who prefer to point fingers rather than start examining their own roles in espousing new forms of social responsibility. As Grande (2004) contends:

In this context, the voices of indigenous and other non-Western peoples become increasingly vital, not because such peoples categorically possess any kind of magical, mystical power to fix countless generations of abuse and neglect, but because non-Western peoples and nations exist as living critiques of the dominant culture, providing critique-al knowledge and potentially transformative paradigms. (p. 65)

What is more, elaborating a different logic-that of the gift-in and for contemporary contexts is different from the trend of evoking (often undefined) 'traditions' and formulating action plans grounded on cultural authenticity, nationalism or separatism. An uncritical reinscription of tradition is problematic for many reasons but particularly because of the real dangers of further excluding already marginalized groups such as indigenous women (Green, 2004; LaRocque, 1997).

However, the reality is that contemporary indigenous peoples generally continue to be culturally, socially, economically and spiritually more directly dependent on their lands and surrounding natural environments. This thinking is still a central part of indigenous philosophies while for many other peoples, this previously existing connection and relationship with the physical surroundings started to erode generations ago as a result of modernization, colonization and other developments since the Renaissance and Enlightenment which continue today in the form of neocolonialism and patriarchal global capitalism.

In cultures and societies that foreground reciprocity, individuals are brought up with an understanding and expectation of acting for others. In other words, the notion of responsibility is an integral part of being human and an inseparable part of one's identity. Armstrong (1996), an Okanagan writer and educator, articulates her identity and thus, her responsibilities, as follows:

I know the mountains, and by birth, the river is my responsibility: They are part of me. I cannot be separated from my place or my land. When I introduce myself to my own people in my own language, I describe these things because it tells them what my responsibilities are and what my goal is. (p. 461)

By recognizing her responsibilities, Armstrong knows her location and her role in her community; in short, she knows who she is. This notion of responsibility stems from a perception of interrelatedness of all life forms-that it is her responsibility to ensure the well-being of the mountains and river because it is directly related to her personal as well as to her community's well-being. Nuu-chah-nulth hereditary whaling chief and the founding Chair of the World Council of Whalers, Happynook (2000), elaborates this understanding as follows:

When we talk about indigenous cultural practices we are in fact talking about responsibilities that have evolved into unwritten tribal laws over millennia. These responsibilities and laws are directly tied to nature and are a product of the slow integration of cultures within their environment and the ecosystems. Thus, the environment is not a place of divisions but rather a place of relations, a place where cultural diversity and bio-diversity are not separate but in fact need each other. (n.p.)4 In western philosophical tradition, responsibility is considered a complex concept discussed and theorized by numerous scholars. Gasché (1995), for example, argues that "[t]here is perhaps no theme more demanding than that of 'responsibility'" (p. 227). A normative definition in this tradition views responsibility "as a mechanical application of a framework of rules that simultaneously relieves the subject of the onus of decision and, hence, of all liability" (Gasché, 1995, p. 227). On the other hand, however, responsibility implies a responsible response which can take place "only if the decision is truly a decision, not a mechanical reaction to, or an effect of, a determinate cause" (Gasché, 1995, p. 227). Gasché (1995) further notes that considering responsibility involves a number of risks and thus, "[a] responsible discourse on responsibility can indeed only assert itself in the mode of a 'perhaps'" (p. 228). For Heidegger, responsibility is "a response to which one commits oneself" (as cited in Gasché, 1995, p. 228). This idea of responsiveness or respondence is further explicated by Spivak whose notion of responsibility reflects Bakhtin's articulation of 'answerability.'6 Spivak (1994) proposes that response: involves not only 'respond to,' as in 'give an answer to,' but also the related situations of 'answering to,' as in being responsible for a name (this brings up the question of the relationship between being responsible for/to ourselves and for/to others); of being answerable...( p. 22)

Responsibility signifies the act of response which completes the transaction of speaker and listener, as well as the ethical stance of making discursive space for the 'other' to exist. For Spivak, "ethics are not just a problem of knowledge but a call to a relationship" (Spivak, Landry, & Maclean, 1996, p. 5). If responsibility cannot be merely mechanical expectation to answer, what does it mean, then, to call for a willingness to give a response and for ability to response (i.e., response-ability)?

Responsibility necessitates knowledge. It requires knowing how to respond but also act in a responsible manner. Derrida (1992) suggests that "not knowing, having neither a sufficient knowledge or consciousness of what being responsible means, is of itself a lack of responsibility" (p. 25). If knowledge is a prerequisite for responsibility, ignorance presents a serious threat to responsible, response-able behaviour and thinking. Moreover, responsibility demands action:

If it is true that the concept of responsibility has, in the most reliable continuity of its history, always implied involvement in action, doing, a praxis, a decision that exceeds simple conscience or simple theoretical understanding, it is also true that the same concept requires a decision or responsible action to answer for itself consciously, that is, with knowledge of a thematics of what is done, of what action signifies, its causes, ends, etc. (Derrida, 1992, p. 25)

Responsibility as action beyond theorizing poses a possibility of an interruption: "there is no responsibility without a dissident and inventive rupture with respect to tradition, authority, orthodoxy, rule, or doctrine" (Derrida, 1992, p. 27). Responsibility as a rupture of tradition may sound at odds with indigenous perceptions and practices of responsibility which emphasize the continuance of tradition. However, no tradition is static, remaining unchanged throughout history, as indigenous people also repeatedly stress, particularly when confronted by irresponsible demands for authenticity. There has always been a rupture, both inventive (usually from within) and intrusive, and interventionist (usually from without).6 In the context of the academy, responsibility with an inventive rupture implies, first and foremost, the ability of interrupting the self, of moving beyond the 'I' as the ethical subject (Derrida, 1997, p. 52).

Although the academy is prone to list its responsibilities in its lofty vision statements and to call for the responsibilities of students and researchers, we frequently witness the unwillingness of the institution itself to respond, to be answerable and take action. Instead of opening up toward the other, the representatives who feel implicated become defensive or remain silent. As Derrida notes in the above quote, responsibility links consciousness with conscience. It is inadequate to merely know one's responsibilities; one also has to be conscious of the consequences of one's actions. Without conscience, there is a risk of the arrogance of a 'clean conscience.'

Derrida further calls for "new ways of taking responsibility" in the academy which are critical of the professionalization of the university (Derrida, 1983). These new ways would signify rethinking the university institution, examining its disciplinary structures and in particular, "a new way of educating students that will prepare them to undertake new analyses" (Derrida, 1983, p. 16). Moreover, Derrida (1983) notes:

New responsibilities cannot be purely academic. If they remain extremely difficult to assume, extremely precarious and threatened, it is because they must at once keep alive the memory of a tradition and make an opening beyond any program, that is, toward what is called the future. ( p. 16)

New ways of taking responsibility in the academy are linked to the question: What constitutes a 'good' university? If the new responsibilities cannot be purely academic, the answers cannot always be found there either. One has to make an opening beyond the academy. I suggest considering the Okanagan concept of En'owkin that signifies a process of group commitment to find the most appropriate solutions through a respectful dialogue. En'owkin is a collective process that seeks to find ways to include those voices that are in a minority. En'owkin recognizes that these voices are most needed and that understanding these voices is critical for meaningful, good governance. Practiced in community and extended family circles, the idea of En'owkin is not to make decisions but to hear all the voices. The premise of En'owkin is that nobody alone can have the answers and that if somebody is arguing for his or her point, there is no need to listen. The most important aspect is not to stage an argument but to ensure that every perspective is being heard. In other words, En'owkin implies that one is not participating in the process in order to debate or enforce one's own agenda but to try to understand the most oppositional thinking to one's own and recognize its importance so that the difference becomes diversity. If these aspects of listening and dialoguing are not taken into account and followed, there are no rational outcomes and as a result, people are taking serious risks for the next generations (Armstrong,1996).7 As with the logic of the gift and gift giving practices, it is not difficult to see how the principles of En'owkin could be practiced in the academy in the name of a 'good' university that is ready to take its responsibilities in a new way, beyond the academy.